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We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may
contain ties, and may be of bounded length. Such restrictions arise naturally in practical
applications, such as centralised matching schemes that assign graduating medical students
to their ﬁrst hospital posts. In such a setting, weak stability is the most common solution
concept, and it is known that weakly stable matchings can have different sizes. This
motivates the problem of ﬁnding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching, which
is known to be NP-hard in general. We show that this problem is solvable in polynomial
time if each man’s list is of length at most 2 (even for women’s lists that are of unbounded
length). However if each man’s list is of length at most 3, we show that the problem
becomes NP-hard (even if each women’s list is of length at most 3) and not approximable
within some δ > 1 (even if each woman’s list is of length at most 4).
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Stable Marriage problem (sm) was introduced in the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [3]. In its classical form,
an instance of sm involves n men and n women, each of whom speciﬁes a preference list, which is a total order on the
members of the opposite sex. A matching M is a set of (man, woman) pairs such that each person belongs to exactly one
pair. If (m,w) ∈ M , we say that w is m’s partner in M , and vice versa, and we write M(m) = w , M(w) =m.
We say that a person x prefers y to y′ if y precedes y′ on x’s preference list. A matching M is stable if it admits
no blocking pair, namely a (man, woman) pair (m,w) such that m prefers w to M(m) and w prefers m to M(w). Gale
and Shapley [3] proved that every instance of sm admits at least one stable matching, and described an algorithm—the
Gale/Shapley algorithm—that ﬁnds such a matching in time that is linear in the input size. In general, there may be many
stable matchings (in fact exponentially many in n) for a given instance of sm [13].
Incomplete lists. A variety of extensions of the basic problem have been studied. In the Stable Marriage problem with
Incomplete lists (smi), the numbers of men and women need not be the same, and each person’s preference list consists of
a subset of the members of the opposite sex in strict order. A (man, woman) pair (m,w) is acceptable if each member of
the pair appears on the preference list of the other. A matching M is now a set of acceptable pairs such that each person
belongs to at most one pair. In this context, (m,w) is a blocking pair for a matching M if (a) (m,w) is an acceptable pair,
✩ A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of ACiD 2006: the 2nd Algorithms and Complexity in Durham workshop, Texts in
Algorithmics, vol. 7, College Publications, 2006, pp. 95–106.
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deﬁnitions of a matching and a blocking pair, we lose no generality by assuming that the preference lists are consistent (i.e.,
given a (man, woman) pair (m,w), m appears on the preference list of w if and only if w appears on the preference list
of m). As in the classical case, there is always at least one stable matching for an instance of smi, and it is straightforward to
extend the Gale/Shapley algorithm to give a linear-time algorithm for this case. Again, there may be many different stable
matchings, but Gale and Sotomayor [4] showed that every stable matching for a given smi instance has the same size and
matches exactly the same set of people.
Ties. An alternative extension of sm arises if preference lists are allowed to contain ties. In the Stable Marriage problem
with Ties (smt) each person’s preference list is a partial order over the members of the opposite sex in which indifference
is transitive. In other words, each person p’s list can be viewed as a sequence of ties, each of length  1; p prefers each
member of a tie to everyone in any subsequent tie, but is indifferent between the members of any single tie. In this
context, three deﬁnitions of stability have been proposed [6,11]. Among these three stability criteria, it is weak stability that
has received the most attention in the literature [7–10,15–17,19]. A matching M is weakly stable if there is no pair (m,w),
each of whom prefers the other to his/her partner in M . For a given instance of smt, a weakly stable matching is bound to
exist, and can be found in linear time by breaking all ties in an arbitrary way (i.e. by strictly ranking the members of each
tie arbitrarily) and applying the Gale/Shapley algorithm.
Ties and incomplete lists. If we allow both of the above extensions of the classical problem simultaneously, we obtain the
Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (smti). In this context a matching M is weakly stable if there is no
acceptable pair (m,w), each of whom is either unmatched in M or prefers the other to his/her partner in M . Once again, it
is easy to ﬁnd a weakly stable matching, merely by breaking all the ties in an arbitrary way and applying the Gale/Shapley
algorithm. However, the ways in which ties are broken will, in general, affect the size of the resulting matching. It is
therefore natural to consider max smti, the problem of ﬁnding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching (henceforth
a maximum weakly stable matching), given an instance of smti. max smti turns out to be NP-hard, even under quite severe
restrictions on the number and lengths of ties [19]. Speciﬁcally, NP-hardness holds even if ties occur in the men’s preference
lists only, each tie is of length 2, and each tie comprises the whole of the list in which it appears [19]. (Note that, in the
smti instance constructed by the reduction in [19], there are men with strictly ordered preference lists of length at least 3.)
The Hospitals/Residents problem. The Hospitals/Residents problem (hr) is a many-to-one generalisation of smi, so called
because of its application in centralised matching schemes for the allocation of graduating medical students, or residents, to
hospitals [20]. The best known such scheme is the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [22] in the US, but similar
schemes exist in Canada [21], in Scotland [12,23], and in a variety of other countries and contexts. In fact, this extension
of sm was also discussed by Gale and Shapley under the name of the College Admissions problem [3]. In an instance of
hr, each resident has a preference list containing a subset of the hospitals, and each hospital ranks the residents for which
it is acceptable. In addition, each hospital has a quota of available posts. In this context, a matching is a set of acceptable
(resident, hospital) pairs so that each resident appears in at most one pair and each hospital in a number of pairs that is
bounded by its quota. The deﬁnition of stability is easily extended to this more general setting (see [6] for details). It is
again the case that every problem instance admits at least one stable matching [3], and that all stable matchings have the
same size [4]. Clearly smi is equivalent to the special case of hr in which each hospital has a quota of 1.
The Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (hrt) allows arbitrary ties in the preference lists. The deﬁnition of weak
stability can be extended in a natural way to the hrt context [14]. Since hrt is clearly an extension of smti, the hardness
results for weak stability problems in the latter extend to the former. These results have potentially important implications
for large-scale real-world matching schemes. It is unreasonable to expect, say, a large hospital to rank in strict order all of
its many applicants, and any artiﬁcial rankings, whether submitted by the hospitals themselves, or imposed by the matching
scheme administrators, may have signiﬁcant implications for the number of residents assigned in a stable matching.
Bounded length preference lists. In the context of many large-scale matching schemes, the preference lists of at least one
set of agents tend to be short. For example, until recently, students participating in the Scottish medical matching scheme
[12,23] were required to rank just three hospitals in order of preference. This naturally leads to the question of whether the
problem of ﬁnding a maximum weakly stable matching becomes simpler when preference lists on one or both sides have
bounded length.
Let (p,q)-max smti denote the restriction of max smti in which each man’s list is of length at most p and each woman’s
list is of length at most q. We use p = ∞ or q = ∞ to denote the possibility that the men’s lists or women’s lists respectively
are of unbounded length. Halldórsson et al. [8] showed that (4,7)-max mti is NP-hard and not approximable within some
δ > 1 unless P = NP. Halldórsson et al. [9] gave an alternative reduction from Minimum Vertex Cover to max smti, showing
that the latter problem is not approximable within 2119 unless P = NP. By starting from the NP-hard restriction of Minimum
Vertex Cover to graphs of maximum degree 3 [5], the same reduction shows NP-hardness for (5,5)-max smti.
In this paper we consider other values of p and q, to identify the ‘borderline’ between polynomial-time solvability
and NP-hardness for (p,q)-max smti. We show in Section 2 that (2,∞)-max smti is polynomial-time solvable using a
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contrast, in Section 3 we show that (3,3)-max smti is NP-hard, even if the ties belong to the preference lists of one sex
only. In Section 4 we give an inapproximability result, namely that (3,4)-max smti is not approximable within some δ > 1
unless P = NP. Finally, in Section 5 we present some concluding remarks.
2. Algorithm for (2,∞)-MAX SMTI
In this section we present a polynomial-time algorithm for max smti where the preference lists of both men and women
may contain ties, the men’s lists are of length at most 2 and the women’s lists are of unbounded length. Let I be an instance
of this problem, and let n1 and n2 be the numbers of men and women respectively in I .
Consider the algorithm (2,∞)-max-smti-alg shown in Fig. 1. The algorithm consists of three phases, where each phase
is highlighted in the ﬁgure. We use the term reduced lists to refer to participants’ lists after any deletions made by the
algorithm. Phase 1 of (2,∞)-max-smti-alg is a simple extension of the Gale/Shapley algorithm, and is used to delete
certain (man, woman) pairs that can never be part of any weakly stable matching. To “delete the pair (mi,w j)”, we delete
mi from w j ’s list and delete w j from mi ’s list. Phase 1 proceeds as follows. All men are initially unmarked. While some
man mi remains unmarked and mi has a non-empty reduced list, we set mi to be marked—it is possible that mi may again
become unmarked at a later stage of the execution. If mi ’s reduced list is not a tie of length 2, we let w j be the woman in
ﬁrst position in mi ’s reduced list. Then, for each strict successor mk of mi on w j ’s list, we delete the pair (mk,w j) and set
mk to be unmarked (regardless of whether or not he was already marked).
We remark that the following situation may occur during phase 1. Suppose that some man mi is indifferent between two
women w j and wk on his original preference list, and suppose that during some iteration of the while loop he becomes
marked. We note that the algorithm does not delete the strict successors of mi on w j ’s list at this stage. Now suppose that,
during a subsequent loop iteration, the pair (mi,wk) is deleted. Then mi becomes unmarked, only to be re-marked during
a subsequent loop iteration. This re-marking results in the deletions of all pairs (mr,w j), where mr is a strict successor of
mi on w j ’s list, as required.
In phase 2 we construct a weighted bipartite graph G and ﬁnd a minimum cost maximum matching in G using the
algorithm in [2]. The graph G is constructed using Algorithm BuildGraph shown in Fig. 2. That is, each man and woman
is represented by a vertex in G , and for each man mi on woman w j ’s reduced list, we add an edge from mi to w j with
cost rank(w j,mi), where rank(w j,mi) is the rank of mi on w j ’s reduced list (i.e. 1 plus the number of strict predecessors
of mi on w j ’s reduced list). We then ﬁnd a minimum cost maximum matching MG in G .
In general, after phase 2, MG need not be weakly stable in I . In particular, some man mi who has a reduced list of
length 2 that is strictly ordered may be assigned to his second-choice woman wk in MG , while his ﬁrst-choice woman w j
may be unassigned in MG . Clearly (mi,w j) blocks such a matching. To obtain a weakly stable matching M from MG we
execute phase 3. Initially M is set to be equal to MG . Next, we move each such mi to his ﬁrst-choice woman. We note that
mi must be in the tail of w j ’s reduced list (this is the set of one or more entries tied in last place on w j ’s reduced list)
since mi must have been marked during Phase 1, causing all strict successors of mi on w j ’s list to be deleted. Further, we
note that there may exist more than one such man in w j ’s tail who satisfy the above criterion. Moreover when mi moves
to w j , wk becomes unassigned in M . As a result, there may be some other man mr (who strictly ranks wk in ﬁrst place)
/* Phase 1 */
set all men to be unmarked;
while (some man mi is unmarked and
mi has a non-empty reduced list) do
set mi to be marked;
if mi ’s reduced list is not a tie of length 2 then
w j := woman in ﬁrst position on mi ’s reduced list;
for each strict successor mk of mi on w j ’s list do
set mk to be unmarked;
delete the pair (mk,w j);
/* Phase 2 */
G := BuildGraph();
MG := minimum cost maximum matching in G;
/* Phase 3 */
M := MG ;
while (there exists a man mi who is assigned
to his second-choice woman wk in M
and his ﬁrst-choice woman w j is unassigned in M) do
M := M \ {(mi ,wk)};
M := M ∪ {(mi ,w j)};
return M;
Fig. 1. Algorithm (2,∞)-max-smti-alg.
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E := ∅;
for each man mi ∈ M do
for each woman w j on mi ’s reduced list do
E := E ∪ {(mi ,w j)};
cost(mi ,w j) := rank(w j ,mi);
G := (V , E);
return G;
Fig. 2. Algorithm BuildGraph.
who now satisﬁes the loop condition. This process is repeated until no such man exists. Upon termination of phase 3 we
will show that the matching M returned is a maximum weakly stable matching.
We begin by showing that the algorithm (2,∞)-max-smti-alg terminates. It is easy to see that each of phases 1 and 2
is bound to terminate. The following lemma shows that the same is true for phase 3.
Lemma 1. Phase 3 of (2,∞)-max-smti-alg terminates.
Proof. We show that the while loop terminates during an execution E of phase 3. For, at a given iteration of the while loop
of phase 3, let mi be some man assigned to his second-choice woman wk in M and suppose that his ﬁrst-choice woman
w j is unassigned in M , where mi ’s reduced list is of length 2 and is strictly ordered. Then during E , mi switches from wk
to w j . Hence each such mi must strictly improve (in fact mi can only improve at most once). Therefore since the number
of men is ﬁnite, phase 3 is bound to terminate. 
We next show that phase 1 of (2,∞)-max-smti-alg never deletes a weakly stable pair, which is a (man, woman) pair
that belongs to some weakly stable matching in I .
Lemma 2. The algorithm (2,∞)-max-smti-alg never deletes a weakly stable pair.
Proof. Let (mi,w j) be a pair deleted during an execution E of (2,∞)-max-smti-alg such that (mi,w j) ∈ M , where M is a
weakly stable matching in I . Without loss of generality suppose this is the ﬁrst weakly stable pair deleted during E . Then
mi was deleted from w j ’s list during some iteration q of the while loop of phase 1 during E . This deletion was made as a
result of w j being in ﬁrst position in the reduced list of some man mr , where mr ’s reduced list was not a tie of length 2,
and w j prefers mr to mi . Then in M , mr must obtain a woman ws such that mr either prefers ws to w j or is indifferent
between them, otherwise (mr,w j) blocks M . Therefore during E , in both cases (mr,ws) must have already been deleted
before iteration q, a contradiction. 
Finally we prove that the matching returned by (2,∞)-max-smti-alg is weakly stable in I .
Lemma 3. The matching returned by algorithm (2,∞)-max-smti-alg is weakly stable in I .
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that the matching M output by the algorithm (2,∞)-max-smti-alg is not weakly stable.
Then there exists a pair (mi,w j) that blocks M . We consider the following four cases corresponding to a blocking pair.
Case (i): both mi and w j are unassigned in M . Then mi is unassigned in MG , and either w j is unassigned in MG
or becomes unassigned during phase 3. First suppose that w j is unassigned in MG . Then the size of the matching MG
could be increased by adding the edge (mi,w j) to MG , contradicting the maximality of MG . Now suppose that w j became
unassigned as a result of phase 3. Let mp1 denote w j ’s partner in MG . Then during phase 3, mp1 must have become
assigned to his ﬁrst-choice woman wq1 . Suppose wq1 was unassigned in MG . Then we can ﬁnd a larger matching by
augmenting along the path (mi,w j), (w j,mp1), (mp1 ,wq1 ), contradicting the maximality of MG . Therefore wq1 must have
been assigned in MG and became unassigned as a result of phase 3. Hence the man mp2 , to whom wq1 was assigned
in MG , switched to his ﬁrst-choice woman wq2 . Using an argument similar to that above for wq1 , we can show that wq2
must be assigned in MG . Therefore some man switched from wq2 during phase 3 to his ﬁrst-choice woman. If we continue
this process, since each man must strictly improve and the number of men is ﬁnite, there exists a ﬁnite number of women
that can become unassigned as a result of phase 3. Hence at some point there exists a man mpr who switches to his ﬁrst-
choice woman wqr and wqr was already unassigned in MG . We can then construct an augmenting path in G of the form
(mi,w j), (w j,mp1), (mp1 ,wq1 ), (wq1 ,mp2 ), (mp2 ,wq2 ), . . . , (mpr ,wqr ), which contradicts the maximality of MG .
Case (ii): mi is unassigned in M and w j prefers mi to her assignee mk in M . Then mi is unassigned in MG . Suppose that
w j is assigned to mk in MG . As w j prefers mi to mk , we could obtain a matching with a smaller cost, but with the same
size, by removing (mk,w j) and adding (mi,w j) to MG , a contradiction. Now suppose that w j is not assigned to mk in MG .
Then w j is either unassigned in MG or w j is assigned in MG to mr , where mr = mk and mr = mi . If w j is unassigned in
MG , we contradict the maximality of MG . Now suppose w j is assigned to mr in MG . Then since w j is no longer assigned
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MG or ws became unassigned as a result of some man switching from ws to his ﬁrst-choice woman. Again using a similar
argument to that in Case (i) we obtain an augmenting path that contradicts the maximality of MG .
Case (iii): mi is assigned to ws in M and mi prefers w j to ws and w j is unassigned in M . Thus clearly mi ’s list is of
length 2 and does not contain a tie, and w j is mi ’s ﬁrst-choice woman. In this situation the loop condition of phase 3 is
satisﬁed. Therefore since the algorithm terminates (Lemma 1) this situation can never arise.
Case (iv): mi is assigned to ws in M and mi prefers w j to ws , and w j is assigned to mr in M and w j prefers mi to mr .
Thus again mi ’s list cannot contain a tie, and w j is his ﬁrst-choice woman. Therefore either mi proposed to w j during
phase 1 or w j was deleted from mi ’s list. Hence mr would have been deleted from w j ’s list during phase 1, so it is then
impossible that (mr,w j) ∈ M . 
Since phase 1 of the algorithm never deletes a weakly stable pair (by Lemma 2), a maximum weakly stable matching
must consist of (man, woman) pairs that belong to the reduced lists. We next note that G is constructed from the reduced
lists, and since we ﬁnd a maximum matching in G , the matching output by the algorithm must indeed be a maximum
weakly stable matching (by Lemma 3, and since phase 3 does not change the size of the matching output by the algorithm:
every man matched in MG is also matched in M).
The time complexity of the algorithm is dominated by ﬁnding the minimum cost maximum matching in G = (V , E). The
required matching in G can be constructed in O (
√|E||V | log |V |) time [2]. Let n = |V | = n1 + n2. Since |E| 2n1 = O (n), it
follows that (2,∞)-max-smti-alg has time complexity O (n3/2 logn).
We summarise the results of this section in the following theorem.
Theorem4.Given an instance I of (2,∞)-max smti, algorithm (2,∞)-max-smti-alg returns aweakly stablematching of maximum
size in O (n3/2 logn) time, where n is the total number of men and women in I .
3. NP-hardness of (3,3)-MAX SMTI
In this section we show that, in contrast to the case for (2,∞)-max smti, (3,3)-max smti is NP-hard. The result holds
even if the ties belong to the preference lists of one sex only. In fact we will show that (3,3)-com smti is NP-complete—
this is the problem of deciding, given an instance of smti in which all preference lists are of length at most 3, whether a
complete weakly stable matching (i.e., a weakly stable matching in which everyone is matched) exists. The NP-completeness
of (3,3)-com smti clearly implies the NP-hardness of (3,3)-max smti.
Our proof of this result uses a reduction from a restricted version of sat. More speciﬁcally, let (2,2)-e3-sat denote the
problem of deciding, given a Boolean formula B in CNF in which each clause contains exactly 3 literals and, for each vi ∈ V ,
each of literals vi and v¯ i appears exactly twice in B , whether B is satisﬁable. Berman et al. [1] showed that (2,2)e3-sat is
NP-complete.
Theorem 5. (3,3)-com smti is NP-complete. The result holds even if the ties belong to the preference lists of one sex only.
Proof. Let B be an instance of (2,2)e3-sat. Let V = {v0, v1, . . . , vn−1} and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be the set of variables and
clauses respectively in B . Then for each vi ∈ V , each of literals vi and v¯ i appears exactly twice in B . (Hence m = 4n3 .) Also|c j| = 3 for each c j ∈ C . We form an instance I of (3,3)-com smti as follows. The set of men in I is X ∪ P ∪ Q , where
X =⋃n−1i=0 Xi , Xi = {x4i+r: 0 r  3} (0 i  n − 1), P =
⋃m
j=1 P j , P j = {p1j , p2j , p3j } (1 j m) and Q = {q j: c j ∈ C}. The
set of women in I is Y ∪ C ′ ∪ Z , where Y =⋃n−1i=0 Yi , Yi = {y4i+r: 0 r  3} (0 i  n − 1), C ′ = {csj: c j ∈ C ∧ 1  s  3}
and Z = {z j: c j ∈ C}.
x4i : y4i c(x4i) y4i+1 (0 i n − 1)
x4i+1: y4i+1 c(x4i+1) y4i+2 (0 i n − 1)
x4i+2: y4i+3 c(x4i+2) y4i+2 (0 i n − 1)
x4i+3: y4i c(x4i+3) y4i+3 (0 i n − 1)
psj : z j csj (1 jm∧ 1 s 3)
q j : c1j c2j c3j (1 jm)
y4i : (x4i x4i+3) (0 i n − 1)
y4i+1: (x4i x4i+1) (0 i n − 1)
y4i+2: (x4i+1 x4i+2) (0 i n − 1)
y4i+3: (x4i+2 x4i+3) (0 i n − 1)
csj : psj x(csj) q j (1 jm∧ 1 s 3)
z j : (p1j p2j p3j ) (1 jm)
Fig. 3. Preference lists in the constructed instance of (3,3)-com smti.
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brackets are tied. In the preference list of an agent x4i+r ∈ X (0  i  n − 1 and r ∈ {0,1}), the symbol c(x4i+r) denotes
the woman csj ∈ C ′ such that the (r + 1)th occurrence of literal vi appears at position s of c j . Similarly if r ∈ {2,3} then
the symbol c(x4i+r) denotes the woman csj ∈ C ′ such that the (r − 1)th occurrence of literal v¯ i appears at position s of c j .
Also in the preference list of an agent csj ∈ C ′ , if literal vi appears at position s of clause c j ∈ C , the symbol x(csj) denotes
the man x4i+r−1 where r = 1,2 according as this is the ﬁrst or second occurrence of literal vi in B . Otherwise if literal v¯ i
appears at position s of clause c j ∈ C , the symbol x(csj) denotes the man x4i+r+1 where r = 1,2 according as this is the
ﬁrst or second occurrence of literal v¯ i in B . Clearly each preference list is of length at most 3, and the ties belong to the
women’s preference lists only.
For each i (0  i  n − 1), let Ti = {(x4i+r, y4i+r): 0  r  3} and Fi = {(x4i+r, y4i+r+1)}: 0  r  3}, where addition is
taken modulo 4.
We claim that B is satisﬁable if and only if I admits a complete weakly stable matching.
For, let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B . Deﬁne a complete matching M in I as follows. For each variable vi ∈ V , if
vi is true under f , add the pairs in Ti to M , otherwise add the pairs in Fi to M . Now let c j ∈ C . As c j contains a literal that
is true under f , let s ∈ {1,2,3} denote the position of c j in which this literal occurs. Add the pairs (ptj, ctj) (1 t = s  3),
(psj, z j) and (q j, c
s
j) to M .
As M is a complete matching in I , clearly no woman in Y ∪ Z can be involved in a blocking pair of M in I . Nor can
a man in P (since he can only potentially prefer a woman in Z ) nor a man in Q (since he can only potentially prefer a
woman in C , who ranks him last). Now suppose that (x4i+r, c(x4i+r)) blocks M , where 0  i  n − 1 and 0  r  3. Let
csj = c(x4i+r), where 1  j m and 1  s  3. Then (q j, csj) ∈ M . If r ∈ {0,1} then (x4i+r, y4i+r+1) ∈ M , so that vi is false
under f . But literal vi occurs in c j , a contradiction, since literal vi was supposed to be true under f by construction of M .
Hence r ∈ {2,3} and (x4i+r, y4i+r) ∈ M , so that vi is true under f . But literal v¯ i occurs in c j , a contradiction, since literal v¯ i
was supposed to be true under f by construction of M . Hence M is weakly stable in I .
Conversely suppose that M is a complete weakly stable matching in I . We form a truth assignment f in B as follows.
For each i (0 i  n − 1), M ∩ (Xi × Yi) is a perfect matching of Xi ∪ Yi . If M ∩ (Xi × Yi) = Ti , set vi to be true under f .
Otherwise M ∩ (Xi × Yi) = Fi , in which case we set vi to be false under f .
Now let c j be a clause in C (1  j m). There exists some s (1  s  3) such that (q j, csj) ∈ M . Let x4i+r = x(csj) for
some i (0  i  n − 1) and r (0  r  3). If r ∈ {0,1} then (x4i+r, y4i+r) ∈ M by the weak stability of M . Thus variable vi
is true under f , and hence clause c j is true under f , since literal vi occurs in c j . If r ∈ {2,3} then (x4i+r, y4i+r+1) ∈ M
(where addition is taken modulo 4) by the weak stability of M . Thus variable vi is false under f , and hence clause c j is
true under f , since literal v¯ i occurs in c j . Hence f is a satisfying truth assignment of B . 
4. Inapproximability of (3,4)-MAX SMTI
In this section we give an inapproximability result for (3,4)-max smti. Speciﬁcally, we show that (3,4)-max smti is not
approximable within δ, for some δ > 1, unless P = NP. Our proof involves a reduction from a problem involving matchings
in graphs. A matching M in a graph G is said to be maximal if no proper superset of M is a matching in G . Deﬁne min-mm
to be the problem of ﬁnding a minimum cardinality maximal matching, given a graph G . By [8, Theorem 1], min-mm is
not approximable within some δ0 > 1 unless P = NP. The result holds even for subdivision graphs of cubic graphs. (Given a
graph G , the subdivision graph of G , denoted by S(G), is obtained by subdividing each edge {u,w} of G in order to obtain
two edges {u, v} and {v,w} of S(G), where v is a new vertex.)
Theorem 6. (3,4)-max smti is NP-hard and not approximable within δ, for some δ > 1, unless P = NP.
Proof. Let G be an instance of min-mm restricted to subdivision graphs of cubic graphs. Then G = (U ,W , E) is a bipartite
graph where, without loss of generality, each vertex in U has degree 2 and each vertex in W has degree 3. Let U =
{m1, . . . ,ms} and let W = {w1, . . . ,wt}. For each vertex mi ∈ U , let Wi denote the two vertices adjacent to mi in G . Similarly
for each vertex w j ∈ W , let U j denote the three vertices adjacent to w j in G . We construct an instance I of (3,4)-max smti
as follows: let U ∪ X be the set of men and let W ∪ Y be the set of women, where X = {x1, . . . , xt} and Y = {y1, . . . , ys}.
The preference lists of the men and women in I are as follows:
mi : (Wi) yi (1 i  s) w j : (U j) x j (1 j  t)
xi : wi (1 i  t) y j : mj (1 j  s)
In a given preference list, entries within round brackets are tied. Clearly the length of each man’s preference list is at most 3,
whilst the length of each woman’s preference list is at most 4. We claim that s+(I) = s + t − β−1 (G), where s+(I) denotes
the maximum size of a weakly stable matching in I and β−1 (G) denotes the minimum size of a maximal matching in G .
For suppose that G has a maximal matching M , where |M| = β−1 (G). We construct a matching M ′ in I as follows. Initially
let M ′ = M . There remain s − |M| men in U that are unmatched in M ′; denote these men by mir (1  i  s − |M|), and
add (mir , yir ) to M
′ for each such mir . Finally there remain t − |M| women in W that are unmatched in M ′; denote these
R.W. Irving et al. / Journal of Discrete Algorithms 7 (2009) 213–219 219women by w jr (1  r  t − |M|), and add (x jr ,w jr ) to M ′ for each such w jr . Clearly M ′ is a matching in I such that|M ′| = |M| + (s − |M|) + (t − |M|) = s + t − β−1 (G). It is straightforward to verify that M ′ is weakly stable in I , and hence
s+(I) s + t − β−1 (G).
Conversely suppose that M ′ is a weakly stable matching in I , where |M ′| = s+(I). Let M = M ′ ∩ E . The weak stability of
M ′ in I implies that M is maximal in G . Moreover, at most t − |M| women in W are matched in M ′ to men in X , and at
most s − |M| men in U are matched in M ′ to women in Y , and hence |M ′| |M| + (t − |M|) + (s− |M|) = s+ t − |M|. Thus
s+(I) s + t − β−1 (G). Hence the claim is established.
Theorem 1 of [8] shows that it is NP-hard to distinguish between the cases that β−1 (G) c0m and β
−
1 (G) > δ0c0m, where
c0 > 0 is some constant and m = |E|. Now if β−1 (G) c0m then s+(I) cs, whilst if β−1 (G) > δ0c0m then s+(I) < δcs, where
c = (5− 6c0)/3 and δ = (5− 6δ0c0)/(5− 6c0). The result follows by Theorem 1 and Proposition 4 of [8]. 
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a polynomial-time algorithm for (2,∞)-max smti, but have shown that, by contrast,
(3,3)-max smti is NP-hard and (3,4)-max smti is not approximable within some δ > 1 unless P = NP.
For the NP-hard variants of (p,q)-max smti, it remains to investigate the existence of approximation algorithms for these
problems that improve on the performance guarantees of those that have already been formulated for the general smti case
(with no assumptions on the lengths of the preference lists) [9,16–19].
Also, the natural extension of (p,q)-max smti to the many-one hrt case may be formulated: we denote this problem
by (p,q)-max hrt. It remains to extend the algorithm for (2,∞)-max smti to the case of (2,∞)-max hrt or prove that
the latter problem is NP-hard. Clearly Theorem 5 implies that (3,3)-max hrt is NP-hard, whilst Theorem 6 implies that
(3,4)-max hrt is NP-hard and not approximable within some δ > 1 unless P = NP.
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